The AXE Man

Promotion, itself, is an imaginative type in these post-present day long stretches of thoughts. On the off chance that individuals later on were to look for ancient rarities of our way of life, in order to find something that gives them knowledge into our way of life and our life, they will have the option to perceive what we desert in this shopper driven world. Our precursors deserted arrow points and stoneware, and we will abandon much more that can without much of a stretch convey about what our identity is and what is imperative to us. Ads and the items they promote are the absolute most significant social ancient rarities in our general public. They convey what is essential to or impacts our way of life, the great and the terrible, on the grounds that inside any culture it is normal for the a wide range of parts of that culture to be depicted on the screen or the page, from our generalizations and inclinations, to what does right by us and what makes us embarrassed. One business that appears to speak to an ancient rarity of American culture is the ongoing Ax business, where a youngster on a sea shore starts to shower Ax cologne, drawing in truly several ample wonders in swimming outfits, with the motto being â€Å"Spray more, Get more†. The suggestions here about the manner in which our way of life generalizations sexual orientation and what sorts of pictures we see as reasonable turns out to be a piece of the ancient rarity and a big motivator for it in our way of life. The initial segment of the advert shows a lady running in a wild. The principal question that rings a bell is if this is a farce of the new Mel Gibson film â€Å"Apocalypto†? The topic of said film is the tracker pursued kind of spine chiller where the hero is consistently on the run (from an Ax man maybe? ). This is additionally suggested by the decision of music †â€Å"Deus Irae† by Karl Jenkins which shows up on his collection â€Å"Requiem†. In any case, at that point the video shows something different. There are a lot more than ladies running and along these lines this is something different. The ladies are completely engaged with the errand of arriving at the objective first. They are determined without a doubt, to the point of being fixated on whatever it is that made them run in any case. All are maneuvering for position and serious pushing and pushing is found in the initial couple of moments. The second thing that hits the watcher is the way that the ladies are not appropriately clad. In the event that they are without a doubt going for a late evening run, at that point where is the games wear expected to carry out the responsibility? It isn't typically ordinary to run with meager apparel! At that point the following thing that hits the watcher is the way that these are a gathering of young ladies running as well as it is really a multitude. The large number running together demonstrates widespread panic. Now the crowd is getting intrigued to know what this political agitation is about; would they say they are chasing for something? Again likenesses can be drawn with â€Å"Apocalypto†. The following scene makes the video somewhat befuddling as a shot is taken from the opposite side of the landscape †a dose of the sea where a comparative number of crowd of ladies are swimming quickly towards the shore. For a moment there one feels this might be something about the â€Å"Iron Woman† rivalry. Yet, at that point it turns out to be clear as the video gives a top shot that shows where all the ladies are going. The multitude is combining on the shore where a singular male figure was splashing Ax cologne, explicitly Ax Lynx. Also, the content flashed at long last saying, â€Å"Spray more. Get more. † On the off chance that the Ax advertisements are to be set apart as anything of quick intrigue, the famous labels that ring a bell promptly are â€Å"pornographic advert† or â€Å"advert with sexual hints. † Such terms are very befitting as we discover the ladies who are running from various land boundaries have smooth, all around kept up bodies with sexual intrigue, and the man on the sea shore stands outfitted with Ax cologne to pull in increasingly such ladies by splashing a greater amount of the heart-crushing aroma. Advertisements remain as a significant relic that can be utilized to comprehend a culture, and this business specifically says a great deal regarding certain sexual orientation related issues. Plugs, for example, this are not just for amusement esteem, they are subliminally sending messages to a populace of individuals that see what they see on TV as truth and certainty. Sometime in the not so distant future, individuals will concentrate such plugs looking for something generally or socially imperative to our age and will rapidly understand that for the entirety of our advances from our perspective and our innovation, we were all the while submitting ourselves to the embarrassment of sex related generalizations and explicitly unequivocal material. In the event that sexual overabundances are not utilized intentionally, at that point why has such a motto been skimmed noticeable all around: Spray more, Get more? Is it not to some degree obscene, stimulating the extravagant of men with the guarantee of winning an armful of femme fatales at one sprinkle of Ax? Why again a crowd of beauties are required with massive sexual charms if no sexual ramifications are expected? At the point when a condom, a bra or undergarments is publicized, similar kinds of pictures are conspicuously strutted over the TV screen, the sexual hints not even unpretentious any longer. Indeed, even in odd spots do we see such utilization of sexuality to sell an item, similar to the ads that are for vehicle protection yet are kid's shows, utilizing the animation character of a charming, buxom young lady to attempt to sell protection for someone’s car. Indeed, even Pizza Hut plugs use Jessica Simpson’s sexuality to sell pizza, and Pepsi has been infamous for utilizing stars, for example, Madonna to sell their item. The truth of the matter is that sex sells. Therefore, on the off chance that completely the antiquity is to be judged, at that point it is a bit of notice in any case and afterward it is explicit I. e. an advert with sexual hints. In my view, whatever terminology might be heaped on the term â€Å"advertisement†, it is an imaginative method of introducing an article or an item. So I might want to call it inventive notice. On the off chance that we move above and beyond we will have the option to see that imaginative and explicitly exploitive adverts apply to a wide range of business stunts to get the buyer youth. There is one more classification that this advert falls into, and that is silly. Regardless of its sexual hints, the business is shot so that, from the outset, it gives off an impression of being innocuous, comedic tone what not. The general population is by all accounts pardoning of any pictures or messages that are not politically right when there is humor required, as for this situation. There is no whining from people in general regardless of whether an obscene picture or video cutting is utilized so as to make a product appealing to the intended interest group. It might seem maligning in the eye of a couple of attentive, preservationist individuals, however to hit the bull’s eye of commercialization, it is a weapon, a need, the need of great importance. Truth be told, this advert was indicated just a single time on British TV preceding a World Cup football match-up where it has reached close to clique status. I never believed myself to be a traditionalist individual, not so much as a tad. I truly believed the Ax business to be an extraordinary one with a comical inclination, yet after I watched it ordinarily intently, there were a few things truly troubling me. While it is regular information that advertisers are utilizing sex to sell their items, the issue that emerges with this business is that it attempted to conceal the sexual substance behind the item itself. The content didn't infer anything sexual and in this manner nobody can blame Ax for deliberately telling men of the advantages of utilizing their cologne regarding their turning out to be alluring explicitly, however the symbolism is sufficient to persuade the watcher that it is selling the item through sex. At the end of the day, Ax is utilizing the dreams of youngsters to acquire them as buyers of their item by promising them, outwardly, that there is something in particular about their item that pulls in ladies. On the off chance that there is a law directing sexual subjects in promoting, at that point it appears that the Ax advert is attempting to beat the framework. The individuals who don't concur with the conspicuous utilization of sex in publicizing, be it suggested or unequivocal, must regard the expressions of Tom Reichert when he composed, â€Å"†¦other types of sexual data is woven into advertisements [†¦] sexual substance can differ in structure and significance, it is essential to give an outline of repeating portrayals of sex in advertising† (Reichert, 2003). The bone of conflict here is the means by which to adhere to a meaningful boundary between what is worthy and what isn't. J. Sivulka had cautioned that â€Å"when researchers have clarified the changing idea of sex in promoting, they have regularly seen this move as a development from a generally blameless portrayal of an explicitly appealing lady to another sort of picture, wherein sex is explicit† ( Sivulka, 2003). The world it appears is partitioned over what sort of judgment to give this kind of TV advertisement, however for the individuals who are searching for substance there is just a single decision. For the individuals who are worn out on being given data that did not depend on truth but instead on suppositions and mainstream society, the decision isn't sure. In the Ax business the main thing that doesn't get away from the watcher is the generalizing of the female. Geral Tellis saw that, â€Å"One of the most widely recognized reactions of promoting is the sex generalizing [†¦] endorsers are ordinarily introduced as youthful, excellent, and explicitly attractive†¦Ã¢â‚¬  (Tellis, 2004). As a female watching this business I felt it not exclusively was the feared generalizing being utilized yet additionally the way that ladies were delineated as not having the insight to understand what was happening and moreover, that ladies were not esteemed for their astuteness by any means, however for their appearance. The ladies were depicted like clowns, marching themselves with no respect for their self-esteem, with no conspicuous knowledge (in direct diverge from the ‘Iron Woman’ correlation). Rather than indicating a business wher

Pride and Prejudice Plot Essay Example for Free

Pride and Prejudice Plot Essay Elizabeth Bennet gets two proposition; one from Mr Collins and one from Mr Darcy. Mr Collins was a tall and substantial looking man of a quarter century. In spite of the fact that he was considerate and respectful he was likewise vainglorious and had a self-expanded sense of self. He constantly gave endless talks about nothing and exhausted everybody to death. Mr Collins complimented everybody continually except some of the time improperly. He asked to know which of his reasonable cousins the greatness of its cooking was owed. - By this, Mrs Bennet was affronted and guaranteed him they were in reality ready to keep a decent cook. This indicated his absence of judgment in when to commend. He was additionally very foolish and Mr Bennets mockery frequently went totally unnoticed. For instance, on page 54, Mr Bennet inquired as to whether his honeyed words were readied and Mr Collins conceded that occasionally he would consider them for his delight! Woman Catherine de Bourgh who was his patroness utilized him. He cowered to her continually as she paid his direction; as a result of her, he was center/high society. He was a priest at Hunsford close Rosings, Lady Catherine de Bourghs home. At the point when Mr Bennet kicks the bucket, Mr Collins will acquire Longburn, as Mr Bennet can't go out to his better half; ladies couldnt acquire. In Mr Collins letter, he proposes to make harmony with the family. Mr Darcy then again was generally excellent looking. He before long drew the consideration of the room by his fine tall individual, attractive highlights, respectable aura He is likewise portrayed as a fine figure of a man. Yet, he was destined to be found to be pleased over his organization. He was cunning, and yet he was haughty, saved and exacting. He claimed Pemberly Estate and got one thousand per year. - He was high society and he knew it; He had seen an assortment of individuals in whom there was little excellence and no style for none of whom he had felt the littlest intrigue. Darcy and Bingley had a decent fellowship regardless of numerous distinctions. Bingley made certain of being enjoyed any place he showed up; Darcy was constantly giving offense. Darcy had no comical inclination and let it out. He couldnt see the amusing side of life while Bingley was happy and gotten a kick out of the chance to appreciate all that he did. In the past Wickam and Darcy had a contradiction. Mr Darcys father had guaranteed Wickam a spot in the congregation yet when he kicked the bucket Darcy wouldn't support him. Mr Collins first clues on his likely arrangements in quite a while letter to the Bennets when he composes; I can't be in any case than worried at the methods for harming your friendly little girls, and ask leave to apologize for it, just as to guarantee you of my availability to make them each conceivable revises. On the primary day of remaining at Longburn, he, in a discussion to Mrs Bennet said; I can guarantee the youngsters that I come arranged to appreciate them. - Here he gave Mrs Bennet a little look at his aims. Jane Austin at that point parted with it saying that presently having a decent house and pay; Mr Collins was in need of a spouse. He was likewise satisfying Catherine de Bourgh who figured he ought to wed. So for the main night Jane was the settled decision being the oldest, yet the prettiest - this was, until he was educated by Mrs Bennet that she was destined to be locked in to Bingley (embellishment). At that point at the Netherfield Ball he asked Lizzy to move a few times and she understood she was the divinely selected individual out of the five sisters. Mr Darcy then again was a long way from appreciating Lizzy from the start and when Mr Bingley proposed he hit the dance floor with her at the Meryton Ball he answered that he had not minimal goal of moving. - Bingley was hitting the dance floor with the main attractive young lady in the room. Here he was alluding to Jane. He said Lizzy was middle of the road, however not attractive enough to entice me. At that point at Sir William Lucass party, William attempted to combine up both of them and Darcy didn't avoid, yet Lizzy dismissed him with; I have not minimal expectation of moving. - this was take care of. It was at this gathering Darcy understood his actual affections for her. At Netherfield when Jane went to remain, she became sick and Lizzy being concerned dropped by. Here, she saw that Darcy was continually watching her. Miss Bingley who covertly preferred Darcy, in observing that he was attracted to Lizzy attempted to turn him against her. In any case, all futile, for whatever she stated, he simply stood up for Elizabeth. Miss Bingley, in Mr Darcys shielding her said; I am apprehensive Mr Darcy that this experience has rather influenced your appreciation for her fine eyes. I think when she says this shes half-prodding and half desirous of him preferring her. Before proposing, Mr Collins said to Mrs Bennet, May I trust madam, for your enthusiasm with your reasonable girl Elizabeth, when I request for the respect of a private crowd with her over the span of today? - Here, he was essentially asking Mrs Bennets authorization to propose. He at that point propelled straight into his discourse. Mr Darcy dropped by Lizzy and from the start made light discussion, getting some information about her wellbeing. At that point there was an unbalanced quietness where he probably been attempting to consider how to begin before continuing. - Differences are as of now appearing on the other side. Mr Collins previously said hed picked Lizzy nearly when hed met her (which was a falsehood) and proceeded to determine his explanations behind wedding her. He, as a minister needed to set a guide to the remainder of the area, he figured it would make his glad and he was following Lady Catherine de Bourghs counsel. Hed clearly planed out his discourse cautiously however in his reasons, he had not referenced that he was enamored with her! Darcy then again offered his turn in marriage since he loved her and his initial sentence communicated this unmistakably; Futile I have battled. It won't do. My emotions won't be subdued. You should permit me to disclose to you how I respect and love you. Mr Collins likewise made a few put-down to Lizzy when proposing to her without acknowledging it! For example, he said that in the event that she can't, she my never get another offer. He additionally advises her that on the off chance that she remains single, all she may ever be qualified for is twenty-five pounds when her mom passes on. Darcy put his foot in it as well. In the wake of saying the amount he cherished her, he proceeded to state that it was not his desire to do as such with her associations and status; His feeling of mediocrity - of the family impediments which judgment had constantly restricted to tendency. At the point when he was turned down he thought she was simply insulted; Might you be able to anticipate that me should celebrate in the mediocrity of your associations? - To salute myself on the expectation of relations, your associations? He additionally confessed to attempting to separate Jane and Darcy and even celebrated in his accomplishment of doing as such. In light of dismissal, Mr Collins thinks Lizzy is putting on a show and says this is not out of the ordinary of a woman. He proceeds to express all the great materialistic motivations to wed him neglecting to make reference to things like love. He goes about as though wedding would be a wise venture for Lizzy or something. He at that point guaranteed her that both of her folks affirmed of the marriage. Mr Darcy because of dismissal is stunned and irate yet figures out how to control himself. He inquired as to why he had been can't and figured she should be annoyed by what he had said before; Might you be able to anticipate that me should celebrate in the inadequacy of your associations? Be that as it may, in the wake of saying these words he acknowledged her answer. The two recommendations were made for totally different reasons; Mr Collins clearly proposed for accommodation, though Mr Darcy was enamored. The two men additionally responded in various manners when turned down; in spite of the fact that Mr Collins couldnt take the dismissal, he was not really made a fuss over something besides having his male pride hurt. - Darcy more likely than not been very vexed, to him Lizzy was the lady he needed to spend an incredible remainder with however he made an effort not to show his feelings. The two of them included a ton of highbrow character in their proposition discourses. They imagined that Lizzy would not dismiss somebody of the higher class and she should be appreciative that she was picked out of the various young ladies; both reminded her continually about her status. Mr Collins was progressively close to home referencing both what might happen when her mom and father passed on yet Lizzy got increasingly irate at Darcy due to things he has s aid and done before. Mr Collins and Mr Darcy both said in much detail all the advantages and disadvantages of the marriage. Taking everything into account, the two recommendations have a few likenesses however they contrast in the basic necessity of adoration.

History of a Technology

History of a Technology Social History of a Technology Cell Phone (Part II) Home›Technology Posts›Social History of a Technology Cell Phone (Part II) Technology PostsThe use of cell phone technology has tremendously grown over the years. This technology has reached a very high societal penetration than what the fixed telephones lines have achieved within the hundred-year period since its inception into the market. It is worth noting that most growth has been achieved in Europe and South East Asia, the regions considered to be more traditional (Lorente 2002). The use of the cell phone technology has easily penetrated into different social classes thus changing sociological lifestyle and interactions.This technology is heavily dependent on the social interactions and the interrelations within a given society. This has been a major force in the adoption of the use of the cell phones. People do have a tendency of owning a new product in the market with a feeling of being the pioneers. This explains why t he cell phones were owned by a few when they were rare. These people never owned them entirely for communication but for social class. Very few people really made calls using them.The adoptions of the mobile phones have been fuelled by the social reasons. Most of these factors emanate from outside an individual. These include the social expectation from friends, peers and even the family members. They expect you to own a cell phone because they have one. One therefore has no choice but to buy one. Another factor supporting this is the fact that the incoming calls and the Short Messaging Services have to be answered prompting one to always have a cell phone. People can easily exchange information in terms of SMS. Group meetings can also be easily convened via Short Messaging Services.Studies show that the usage patterns of this technology among the adolescent have been influenced by the collective norms. Many acquire a mobile phone because ‘other friends have it’ and also because it is ‘cool’. This is the age group that has enthusiastically embraced the use of the mobile phones among all the demographic groups. This group has a tendency of adopting products that are status symbols or a product that identifies them with a specific group. Mobile phones have enhanced entertainment industry through music and features which allows for the download of music from the internet. Teenagers can also access their easily through cell phones and thus expand their social networks (Hurrelmann 1995: 163).The traditional telephone was majorly used by professionals for business. It later turned out that the major users were the women who used this technology for their gossips. Due to the revolution and the development of the mobile technology, this industry now heavily depends on the adolescent who use it for SMS and exchange of voice massages.Cell phone remains the only garget that has personalized involvement with much emotionality. Its development has enabled people to access the personalized services within their own mobile phones. These include wallpapers, ring tones, internet access and so on. Lifestyle has been changed due to these developments. This is why it has been widely accepted and embraced than the television sets, digital cameras and VCRs. The fact that one can access internet through a cell phone has made possible for people to develop social networks. Some brands of cell phones enable one to access radio and television services.Easy integration into the society has been enhanced by the use of cell phones. This has been very obvious in the youths. Their interactions with other peers help them to learn more about others in preparation to get to the society. This has been particularly important to those who stay with their parents and are soon to leave them. Through the phone, they find an opportunity to start interacting with the society.This has led to many children escaping from the influence of their parents. They shift their focu s to the larger societal culture for more information. These children join in the activities that are done by other peers and the rest of the society. In America, this has led to a culture known as ‘child culture’. Using the mobile phones, the young can easily connect to each other at any time even as they access other peer group members. These kids are really exposed to a variety of choices that influence their future lives. There various games in the mobile phones which keeps one busy.Families who rely on agriculture have been able to improve their income due to the development of the cell phone technology. Most of these farmers have subscribed to the messaging services with the service providers where they receive updates on how to apply new productive farming methods. These include the types of manure or fertilizers to be used. The effects of these have resulted into high yields of the produce. Market prices of the produce have also been regulated through the use of mobile p hones. One only needs to call what the price of a commodity is in another place in order to set a price. This has immensely reduced the losses of the produce prices. Discrepancies in the prices of the commodities have also been controlled through the ease of communication by mobile phones. The profits made have improved living standards of individual families and at the same the government gets the revenue for the national interest.The development of third-generation (3G) and the fourth-generation (4G) mobile phone networks have even come forth with more application to the users. The phones produced are more sophisticated but still affordable. One of the major applications so far is the mobile financial services. This is also known as ‘m-money’ or ‘m-banking’. The services provided include using the mobile phone to send money to other people, pay the bills, and deposit money into bank accounts.This service has been developed in the developing countries. One of them is Kenya, where M-Pesa mobile service was introduced in 2007 to provide the above services. By 2009, M-Pesa had 8 million subscribers using this service (Communications Commission of Kenya 2009). This drastically changed the lives of many Kenyans. Those who could not reach banks due to distance can simply go to an M-Pesa agent at the local market and deposit or withdraw the money. Payment of bills has become easy as one does not need to carry cash with him. This has really helped the people due to the previous low level of financial development (Aker, 2008).Election campaigns have also been done by the use of mobile phone. This has been used by the aid of the mobile service providers where information is sent or forwarded to the subscribers to convince them to vote for a given candidate. This technology has also been used in election monitoring. The agents and observers use them to verify the authenticity of the results remitted.  Ghana used this method and this led to a very peaceful elect ion unlike in Kenya where the lack of this system led to the post-election violence thus destabilizing the whole country. They had to start rebuilding again after ethnical violence which led to the internal displacement of people (IDPs).In conclusion, it should be noted that the development of the mobile phones have changed the sociological aspect of the society. The benefits are immense across the globe. Lives have been changed, economies have grown and this will continue as long as the technology is with us.

The Social Issue Of Addiction - 869 Words

It affects your health, your life, not only people around you, but loved ones. If people know this, why do they continue to partake in it? Addiction occurs in everyone’s life, ranging from needing a coffee (caffeine) every morning, to needing to shoot up heroin all hours of the day. Everyone is aware of the social issue of addiction, yet the number of people struggling with it increases every year. Addiction needs to be approached differently. I believe money used to criminalize and punish addicts should instead be used to appropriately house, and support them. Maia Szalavitz from Times Magazine describes addiction as, â€Å"any behaviour that is associated with craving and temporary relief, and with long-term negative consequences, that a person is not able to give up.† Society’s solution to drug addiction presently is to criminalize and punish those who acquire these addictions. People look at how to make an addict stop, and become clean; however they fail to realize an important factor, which is why that addict began that behaviour in the first place. People don’t realize the power of addiction; it causes poverty, enhances mental illness, and stigmatizes a person who is an addict, which is why people need to find a better approach to support those struggling with addiction, in order to create a better society. I have firsthand experience with addiction, as I was addicted to marijuana for years. I faced many challenges throughout my teenage years, more than any teenagerShow MoreRelatedAlcohol And Drug Addiction Among People Of Different Ages861 Words   |  4 Pagesdrug addiction are two important topics in today’s society. Alcohol and drug addiction affects people of different ages with different backgrounds and ethnicities. There are many researches and studies regarding underlying reasons and roots of these issues. 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While several 90†²s studies focused on Internet addiction, the next decade saw the growth of a new addiction related to all manner of social networking

Mg375 Operations Management Student Study Guide Final...

MG375 Operations Management Student Study Guide Final Examination 1.12 This is a two-hour, closed book and closed notes test. Therefore, it cannot be a take-home test. Students may use a hand-held calculator during the test provided it does not have features that allow it to take pictures or otherwise store test information other than the current calculation. The calculator cannot have means to communicate via email, instant messenger or any other means. Students are not allowed to use a computer during the test. Students are not allowed to bring extra â€Å"scratch† paper to the exam. They can use the back side of the test for scratch paper if needed. The examination contains twenty multiple choice questions valued at 5 points†¦show more content†¦2 The outputs can be products, services, information and experiences. The transformation of inputs into outputs can be physical conversion or alteration, transportation, storage or inspection when dealing with goods. 3 For services, the change would be more at a personal or even psychological level. From a value perspective, value is created when the value of the outputs is greater than the sum total of the value of inputs. Asforthe word ‘management’, there has been long debate about its meaning. For our purpose, we take the perspective of the functions that managers perform. The five traditional functions that managers perform are planning, organising, coordinating and controlling of resources. Combining these separate definitions into one, operations management can therefore be defined as the planning, organising, coordinating and controlling of transformation of inputs to outputs. These aspects can be represented in the form of a simple model as shown in Figure 1.1. b) Describe how focus dimensions affect the selection of a process structure and develop advantages and disadvantages for using each process structure in a specific situation. c) Project; In this arrangement, the product remains in a fixed location and

Philosophy of My Life Free Essays

Christian tradition has generally passed down that all but one were martyred, with John surviving into old age. Only the death of James, son of Zebedee is described in the New Testament, and the details of the other deaths are the subject of pious legends of varying authenticity. In some cases there is near unanimity in the tradition, and in other cases, there are widely varying and inconsistent accounts. We will write a custom essay sample on Philosophy of My Life or any similar topic only for you Order Now Judas Iscariot, originally one of the Twelve, died during Jesus’ trial. Matthew 27:5 says that he hanged himself, and Acts 1:18 says that he fell, burst open, and his â€Å"bowels gushed out. † Matthias was elected to take his place as one of the Twelve. According to Christian tradition: Original Twelve picked by Jesus: Peter, crucified upside-down in Rome c. AD 64. James, son of Zebedee was beheaded in AD 44, first of the Twelve to die (since the addition of Matthias) John, son of Zebedee, no biblical record of death, he is believed to have died of natural causes due to old age. Members of the The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints believe that John was immortalized and he will live to see the Second Coming of Christ. [21][22] Andrew, Peter’s brother, was crucified upon a diagonal or X-shaped cross. Philip was crucified in AD 54. Bartholomew (also known as Nathaniel) was flayed alive (skinned) and then beheaded; some sources locate his death at Derbend on the Caspian Sea. [23] Matthew killed by an axe in AD 60. Thomas was killed by a spear in Mylapore, Madras, India in AD 72. James, son of Alphaeus, stoned at age 90 then clubbed to death. Jude was clubbed to death then beheaded Simon the Zealot was sawn in half in AD 74. Judas Iscariot, according to Matthew, hanged himself after betraying Jesus. In Acts, he is described as falling in a field and bursting open. Apologists explain this apparent discrepancy by presuming that he decayed on the tree resulting in a bloating with gas and a weakening of the skin. Then when he was let down from the tree he burst open upon impact. A third account by Papias records Judas â€Å"walking the world†, his body having become swollen before being crushed by a chariot. † â€Å"[24] Replacement for Judas Iscariot picked by the surviving eleven: Matthias, Judas’ replacement, was stoned and beheaded. Tombs of the apostles Out of the eleven apostles excluding Judas Iscariot, the burial sites of only seven have been identified by Christian tradition. The St. Peter’s Basilica Vatican, Rome, Italy which was built on the burial site of Peter the Apostle. Basilica of St. Andrew at Patras, Achaea, Greece where the relics of Andrew the Apostle are kept, said to be erected over the place of his martyrdom. Santiago de Compostela Cathedral, Galicia, A Coruna, Spain which houses the tomb of St. James son of Zebedee. The tomb of John the Apostle at Ephesus, near Selcuk, Turkey. The Santhome Basilica, Mylapore, Chennai, India, which houses the tomb of Thomas the Apostle. St. Philip Martyrium, Hierapolis, nea r Denizli, Turkey. It is said that St. Philip is buried in the center of the building, but his grave has not been discovered. On Wednesday, 27 July 2011 the Turkish news agency Anadolu reported that archeologists had unearthed the Tomb of Saint Philip during excavations in the Turkish city of Hierapolis. The Italian professor Francesco D’Andria stated that scientists had discovered the tomb, within a newly revealed church. He stated that the design of the Tomb, and writings on its walls, definitively prove it belonged to the martyred Apostle of Jesus. St. Bartholomew Monastery near Baskale, Turkey. The Monastery was built on the traditional site of the martyrdom of Bartholomew the Apostle. How to cite Philosophy of My Life, Papers

Russia Foreign Policy free essay sample

The domestic political setting and its interplay with the international context are fundamental elements in the analysis of the projection of Russian power and influence. In a constant search for balance between the national interest, international compromises and the bargaining/concessions duality, Russia has been pursuing a policy of affirmation, both in regional and international terms. However, this has been a course where lines of (dis)continuity produce fragile contours that are not always easy to grasp. Underlying this course are issues about Russian identity and how this plays a role both at the domestic level and in external policy dealings. However, an increasingly assertive tone is noticeable. Whether this is still an expression of a loss of empire not yet overcome or the result of powerful internal developments is here analyzed. This paper aims, thus, to analyze Russian foreign policy making, shedding light on lines of continuity and discontinuity in this continuous, though not linear, search for affirmation. We will write a custom essay sample on Russia Foreign Policy or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page Keywords: foreign policy; multi-vectorial; multipolar; identity; Russian Federation Introduction Russian politics after the end of the cold war have undulated according to internal and external constraints, in an effort to adapt and respond to the new internal and international circumstances. The Russian Soviet inheritance remains strong after the breakup of the Soviet bloc, and Moscow’s dealings with its new power status, strategic perceptions and identity construction remain a wide challenge. The Russian Federation is a large country with a unified policy and well defined political, strategic nd economic interests, based on a strong hand at home and tough stance towards foreign issues considered vital to Russian interests, The author acknowledges financial support from the Center for Social Studies and the International Studies Association for the presentation of this paper at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 2008. Thi s is a revised version of the paper presented at this convention. ? 1 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation ursued in many instances outside the traditional contours of democratic practices. The so-called â€Å"managed democracy† intends to be the defining model for anauthoritarian style of ruling based on the holding of electoral processes. This reflects a combination of western values and the so-called â€Å"Russian way†, resulting in a mix in politics. Based on a vertical power formula described by Russian authorities as a needed assurance for order and democratization, the centralization trends in Russian politics seem to contain the weight of the country’s imperial past with which Russia has not yet fully come to terms. In fact, the Soviet imperial logic is still much present in Russian foreign policy, expressed in Russia’s current trend of affirmation and regaining of influence. This alignment has allowed some continuity in Russian post-cold war dealings, despite the upsand-downs resulting from the need to adjust to an all-adapting international context throughout the post-cold war decade (1990-2001). The terrorist attacks of September 2001 in the United States constituted, however, a turning point. The United States became prominent, putting forward an assertive agenda. Russia reacted and followed, adding a more affirmative stance to discourse and action. In a post post-cold war setting, Russian foreign policy became pro-active and assumed an affirmative tone, underlined by pragmatic and realist considerations about Russian possibilities and limits at home and abroad. This paper analyzes the dynamics underlying Russian foreign policy, with the aim of identifying its drivers, strategies and goals. Departing rom the assumption that Russian foreign policy follows the principle that the definition of the national interest is the basis for the pursuit of (inter)national objectives, and taking it in the context of the interlinkage of the internal/external relationship as a bi-directional process in the making of foreign policy (Rosenau, 2006; Katzenstein, 1976; Hill, 2003; Saideman and Ayres, 2007; Alons, 2007), Russian foreign policy dealings are an expression of Moscow’s wis h for affirmation and international recognition of its role in regional and global politics. Driven by a favorable domestic context, through the centralization of power at home and the pursuit of an assertive policy abroad, embracing balancing policies, such as those regarding the United States, containment, with regard to China, or influence and control as happens towards some of the former Soviet republics, it applies multilateral cooperation for attaining a multipolar order, simultaneously with the pursuit of an indisputable place in this international order. This equation of drivers, strategies and goals is underlined by a 2 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation ombination of realpolitik elements, translated in power politics at the basis of Russian foreign policy decision-making and implementation, and constructivist lines, with issues of identity and perception shaping foreign policy outcomes. The projection of Russian power and influence demonstrates a constant search for balance between the national interest, inter national compromises and the bargaining/concessions duality. However, this has been a course where lines of (dis)continuity produce fragile contours that are not always easy to grasp. An increasingly assertive tone is noticeable under Putin, after the inconsistencies of the Yeltsin years. The alignments of the newly elected president in March 2008, Dmitry Medveded, are expected to follow suit on Putin, but are still to be tested. As such, this paper argues that the growing assertiveness in Russian foreign policy is still an expression of a past not yet overcome, of the way(s) Russia defines itself (the identity question), and the result of internal developments that have allowed an empowerment of Russia, elements that clearly contribute to in)actions regarding lines of continuity and discontinuity in the country’s foreign policy, rendering it a continuous, though not linear, search for affirmation. Lines of (dis)continuity in Russian foreign policy: a multi-level model of analysis The post-cold war decade might be described as a decade of â€Å"soft revisionism† as an expression of Russian pursuit of its own place after the breakup of the Soviet Unio n, in a generally non-confrontational way, seeking to maintain the balance between its different foreign policy goals and the international context where these were projected. This decade allowed the clarification of Russian foreign policy objectives, despite various adjustments, resulting in the revision and adoption of fundamental documents, such as the foreign policy concept, the national security concept and the military doctrine (2000). These documents consolidate the directions, options and objectives of Moscow’s external policy with the delineation of preferential areas for action along with the need for an affirmative and more assertive course in both domestic and international terms. September 11 will to some extent project these Russian objectives, as further analyzed. 3 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation Russian foreign policy has been shifting according to several factors, both endogenous and exogenous, though the main post-cold war structuring principles and goals have remained over time. What has been changing and conferring a sense of undulation to Russian policy making has been the conjugation of means and opportunities in the definition and pursuit of interests. The trend suggests that whereas Yeltsin was very much focused on the external context, reacting and adjusting continuously to the changes taking place at the international stage, Putin shifted the focus to internal issues, understanding this move as essential to sustain Russia’s outwards look. This means that with Yeltsin, Russian foreign policy was essentially reactive to the western positioning, either demanding or consenting. This was noticeable particularly in the first years after the end of the cold war, during Yeltsin’s first mandate; the mid 1990s witnessed a change in the orientation of Russian foreign policy, with a more reassuring tone and reaffirmation in what Moscow defined as its â€Å"near abroad†. Primakov was of the utmost relevance in this redesign of Russian foreign policy, as well as in giving more orientation to economic transformation within the country, having been instrumental in the engineering of these fundamental shifts. Maybe the best example of this changing trend was Russia’s hostile reaction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in the Balkans in 1999. It gave a clear demonstration of dissatisfaction with United States and European policies towards the area, and showed a tougher stance in terms of its position in the international system, clearly seeking recognition of its status as a relevant power. With Vladimir Putin, the consolidation of internal growth and stability paved the way for an increasingly affirmative tone in foreign policy. Resting on a pragmatic assessment of Russian possibilities and limits, Putin conferred substance to the concept of a multi-vectorial policy, which has lent to Russian external dealings a sense of continuity and stability by including the CIS as a priority area, as well as the western and Asian dimensions. However, by enlarging the package, Putin also got added leeway, playing with these different dimensions to Russia’s best interest and in the broader game of projecting power in an increasingly interdependent international order (Freire, 2008). Putin’s first mandate allowed therefore the consolidation of a trend initiated with Yeltsin, but which became a solid option in Russia’s foreign policy during his mandates as President of Russia. 4 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States marked a turning point in international politics with the United States affirming its primacy and profoundly changing the ordering of the international (dis)order. Washington assumed an active foreign policy course built over two main lines: one of strategic instability aiming at creating a new multipolar framework of regional security, drawn in its image (a multi-unilateral model, to play with Huntington’s words) (Huntington, 1999: 35); and another of institutionalization of the concert of great powers, on the basis of a very elementary commonly shared security concern, with a particular focus on the fight against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), etc. This strategy, which became global in its expression, has been raising different reactions at the international level, in a context where the post-9/11 power transition problems are not completely settled yet. This unclearness has either been due to a lack of recognition of a new power distribution in the international system or to clashing visions over this same power transition dynamics, in a context itself marked by relative instability and unpredictable events. The Russian Federation has been a bit ambivalent in this regard, both in its understanding of the â€Å"myself/other† relationship and with regard to its selfdefinition as a power, in a volatile international context. Its responses to United States (US) primacy and revisionist posture after 9/11 have shifted between cooperation and competition, in an effort at affirmation in an unfavorable context (where China and India are powers on the rise). Clearly, September 11 constituted an accelerator of tendencies already in place in Russia, with a policy of affirmation gaining added strength, both domestically and with regard to foreign policy. As such, understanding Russian identity is fundamental, as a variable helping to explain the sometimes conflicting nature of its policy orientation. Russian identity has been built between east and west throughout time: for instance, â€Å"Ivan IV was both Khan (Asiatic ruler) and Basileus (Christian emperor)† (Hosking, 2003: 5). The legacies of the historical past of Russia have profoundly marked Russian traditions and cultural perceptions. These also carry with them a demonstration of the Russian â€Å"in-between identity†, combining Euro-Asian elements. In fact, 71% of the population describe themselves as Russians in their own way, an understanding deeply rooted in cultural and historical perceptions as a people, defined as the bridging link between west and east, between Europe and Asia, an 5 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation intimate definition that becomes very much clear in domestic politics and in its external expressions. Internal divisions in Russia, with the Euro-Atlanticists favoring closer ties to the United States and Europe, the Eurasianists looking at the eastern scenario for strategic alliances, including China and India in their horizons, and the Russia-first seeking an affirmation of Russian power on the basis of the country’s imperial legacy, political strength, influence, and economic resources, the scenario at home reveals, in this very simplistic way, the multidimensional foreign policy discourse (see for example Porter, 1996: 121; Lowenhardt, 2000: 167-174). However, the definition of Russian identity does no longer carry the ideological weight that was attached to Soviet ruling, not functioning anymore as a development model carrying normative attractiveness for others. The identity construction process still in progress in Russia, no longer Soviet, but also not democratic in the western sense, has implied a constant search for a regaining of its own identity – a modified identity in a modified context. To some extent, the consolidation of particular trends in Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin has allowed a differentiated and sophisticated Russian approach towards internal and external matters, with â€Å"Putinism† coining a very particular way of ruling. This demonstrates the very much needed ideological framing in Russian politics, with the recovery of massive military parades running through the Red Square in the Soviet style as a clear demonstration of this. Putinism as equal to power centralization and ruling vertical is complementing its model of governance with an ideological frame understood as fundamental for giving consistency and projection capability to Russian foreign policy. In this way, it plays a dual function: one for internal consumption and the other regarding the molding of external perceptions. President Putin’s power and powerful say in foreign policy have managed to transform these various discourses into a unified foreign policy, allowing more coherence in both wording and action. Centralized ruling as a guarantee of stability, and the toughening of politics as an assurance of order, are signs of an authoritarian legacy still much present in Russian policy-making. But despite the identification of continuity elements in the Russian authoritarian course, â€Å"[t]he new Russia is not the Soviet Union, moreover nor is she the old Russian Empire. Her new borders, option, culture, civilization, inner development did make Russia another state that previously had not existed on the global political or geographical 6 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation map† (Kortunov, 2000: 7). Thus, Russian identity is still in the making, combining inheritances from the past and trying to learn how to deal with a new political, social, economic and strategic context. And while still carrying many elements from yesterday, today’s Russia, despite growing political assertiveness, centralized ruling and authoritarian style, is a new Russia, seeking for affirmation in a changed context. The role of political elites and their loyalty to the central governing power has always been a fundamental element in Russian history, as it is still today. Controlling dissident voices, punishing opposition movements, and closely monitoring propagandistic moves were common practice in czarist times and under the Soviet regime, and are still visible in today’s Russia. â€Å"Russia is still best understood as a network of interlocking patron-client relationships. This is one reason why post-Soviet Russia has such difficulty in generating its own sense of civic community† (Hosking, 2003: 6). The institutionalization of the ruling vertical, with support from the political elite close to the president, guarantees political and social control. This strong ruling, which in the exchange of liberty for security gathered ample support, has nevertheless been facing contest from civic movements and opposition groups, though with limited expression. This shows that the elements of democratization experienced in post-cold war Russia have been kept under close scrutiny by the central authorities, which play them off to their own benefit. This is done in a constant game of giving and taking, justifying tough politics at home with the need for order; allowing the ruling vertical on the grounds of building stability; and holding electoral processes as the maximum expression of a democratic country. The very much criticized presidential election of 2 March 2008, from the campaign to the counting of votes, is such an example. In parallel to this domestic dimension, on the international stage, changing patterns in political-economic and strategic dealings have been opening new avenues for cooperation and competition. This is a demonstration of the linkages between the internal and external dimensions of foreign policy making. Foreign policy has to ‘serve’ domestic policy, which includes primarily the establishment of efficient security, the raising of living standards and the development of civil society. †¦) Concern about internal economic and social problems is a more effective way of protecting national interests and hence of making Russia a really great country without relying on the old concept of a ‘Great Russia’. (Slezneva, 2003: 26-27) 7 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation The course of affirmation of Russian politics is therefore both the result of inward and outward driven processes, following a multi-level appr oach, visible in tough politics at home and an assertive stance in international affairs. With Putin, this has, however, been built on an asymmetrical understanding of the internal/external dichotomy, with a clear focus on the internal dimension and the need for domestic consolidation and stability, to then move on to an affirmative course in foreign policy dealings. The US is affirming its primacy in the international system, the European Union (EU) is gaining an increased role in international affairs, India and China are emerging as regional powers – a scenario where Russia struggles with ambiguities in its own search for affirmation and regaining of influence. Describing western engagement in the former Soviet area as interference in a vital area of Russian influence and trying to counter it, Moscow’s political options have been revealing both ambiguities and a toughening in discourse and action. The linkages between domestic choices and external power projection become clear in a complex geostrategic setting where Russia’s affirmative course gains increasingly clear contours. Russian foreign policy after the end of the cold war: Apparent discontinuities Russian foreign policy has evolved from an essentially eactive and, at times, incoherent basis, particularly throughout the first half of the 1990s, to a pro-active, consistent and affirmative policy, which has been reinforced under Putin. Besides becoming assertive on the lines of promoting the national interest and Russia’s affirmation in the international scenario, Moscow’s foreign policy has been making the most of international developments, such as the ter rorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In a pro-western context after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia pursued rapprochement to the west, defining itself as a natural ally of Europe. This approach was evinced in its search for integration into western institutions, seeking membership of the Council of Europe, joining Partnership for Peace in the context of NATO, and deepening relations with the European Communities, based on the signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994, along with the strengthening of ties with Washington. However, the expected 8 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation estern financial assistance proved late and insufficient and the conditionality associated with it ended up generating anti-western feelings and a demand for internal political change, mainly associated to the nationalists and communists. Criticism about western meddling in Russian affairs, particularly regarding the treatment of Russian minorities abroad (namely in the former Soviet republics), raised discontent and pushed the authorities in Moscow towards a more interventionist policy. From 1993, a reaffirmation course became clear in the policy orientation of the Kremlin: reaffirming its role as an influential actor, particularly in regional terms. This course was pursued through economic influence and leverage, political pressure and military strongholds in the former Soviet space, to the discontent of some of these republics. As a guarantor of stability in this neighboring area, Russia assumed the former Soviet space as an area of strategic national interest where outside interference was not welcomed. From 1995 this approach was consolidated, with the initial definition of a multivectorial foreign policy by the Kremlin. By the mid-1990s Russian foreign policy was designed around two main circles: an inner one, encompassing the former Soviet republics, and an outer one, including the western (European and US) and Asian dimensions. Till the end of the post-cold war decade this tendency was reinforced. Since gaining the presidency in 2000, Vladimir Putin has defined Russia’s foreign policy as multi-vectorial and multipolar. The main documents adopted at the beginning of his first mandate state the potential destabilizing role of a â€Å"unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States†, the CIS as an area of strategic importance and the Eastern dimension (the Asia-Pacific region) as a relevant region in Moscow’s external policy (National Security Concept 2000; Russian Military Doctrine 2000; Foreign Policy Concept 2000). Thus, Russia seeks a balanced foreign policy where the search for multiple poles aims at diversifying allies and allowing the shifting of privileged relations in a constant search for counterbalance and primacy. The multi-vectorial formula gains a new dimension under Putin. September 11 added another element to this foreign policy layout: a new international order under the primacy of the US. Putin offered his support to the global fight against terror, and the western critical voices regarding the disrespect and violation of human rights in Russia, and particularly in the Chechen Republic, were almost silenced. In addition, the 9 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation concrete realization that Russia could not do much in the face of inevitable developments, such as EU and NATO enlargement, made Russia change its discourse. This was due to the pragmatic realization that direct confrontation in words would poison its relationship with the west, eventually leading to isolation and consequently add to the country’s fragility (Freire, 2007). In fact, Russia tried to invert a trend it could not contain and use to the best advantage, playing with the further integration of former Soviet republics into these western institutions. Thus, Moscow realized that the inclusion of neighboring countries into NATO nd the EU could lead to further involvement of Moscow in these processes, as well as the pursuit of policies of divide and rule (such as it has been promoting regarding the EU, seeking internal division and consequently politically weakening the Union). â€Å"Russia’s changes in foreign policy since 11 September, therefore, are based on calculations of priority and interest, where risk is distinguished from threat and real needs are separate from false ambitions† (Lynch, 2003: 29-30). Thus, realpolitik principles drive Russian foreign policy dealings. With a realist looking over Russian national interest and external policy priorities, the so-called â€Å"pragmatic nationalism† (Light, 2003: 48), Vladimir Putin power projection and affirmative course rests on an internal stable order and economic growth, mainly sustained by increasing oil and gas revenues, which have been conferring on Russian policy more independence and a self-confidence regarding its role and place in international affairs. This course is acknowledged by Russian authorities, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stating that â€Å"Russian foreign policy today is such that for the first time in its history, Russia is beginning to protect its national interest by using its competitive advantages† [energy geopolitics] (RFE/RL, 2007). The combination of internal and external factors has rendered possible this affirmative stance, with order and growth at home sustaining the search for recognition and legitimacy in regional and global political dealings. The election of Dmitry Medvedev as president of Russia on the 2 March 2008 elections, though implying continuity to â€Å"Putinism†, brought about a new approach towards economic issues – a much needed change, expressed in a policy of diversification in investments, and in the development of other sectorial areas (non-energetic) in order to overcome a clear over-concentration on energy resources. This over-dependency on one economic sector has rendered the Russian economy highly vulnerable, with adjustments 10 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation needed to avoid unexpected fluctuation in oil and gas prices, with direct consequences in the overall performance of the Russian economy. Again, this political move aims at strengthening the foundations of the Russian economy, giving it a solid basis, understood in the Kremlin as an essential part of an affirmative and effective foreign policy. The ‘near abroad’: An expression of revived imperialism? Russian foreign policy objectives include as a first goal the promotion of the CIS as an area of vital interest. It is, nevertheless, a heterogeneous area with differentiated states in their political options, economic resources and social profiles. This means that the Russian goal of influence and control is limited, despite its acknowledged leverage in the area. This has been translated in Moscow’s policy of engagement in economic, political and military terms. The perpetuation of military bases in Moldova and Armenia are one example. In addition, the region’s vast natural resources push Moscow towards controlling pipeline routes and infrastructures as a way of maintaining influence over local governments, while at the same time profiting from these economic assets. Nevertheless, within limits. The colorful revolutions in 2003 in Georgia, 2004 in Ukraine, and 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, have caused concern in Russia about the western-orientation of the new governments and its consequent diminished influence. And Russian attempts at regaining influence, by using energy dependence as an element of pressure, have revealed some miscalculation. With the interruption in oil and gas supplies to Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus, for example, which ended up having a direct impact on European deliveries, Russia faced these countries’ and European criticism. These moves ended up having an opposite effect, with Ukraine and Georgia distancing themselves even more from Russia. The immediate effect has been the search for alternative energy sources, in order to gain an independent stance from Russia. The negotiations over new pipeline routes, with many projects bypassing Russia, demonstrate this increasing search for independence from what is described as a non-reliable partner. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, bringing oil from the Caspian to Turkey and further to Europe is such an example. Energy policies in the area have thus been raised high in the international agenda, with fierce competition over the control of oil and gas production and transit, further deepening Moscow’s feelings of vulnerability. 11 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation In this setting, regional integration processes in the former Soviet space have suffered from a simple malaise: usually they are regarded as pro- or anti-Russian, which renders their existence and meaning difficult to sustain. This is why the CIS has never been effective. Interpreted as a Russian extension of the Soviet Union â€Å"idea†, which was later consolidated in the Russian leadership role within the Commonwealth, the CIS never functioned as a regional grouping, but more as a Russian-led and pro-Russian politics enhancing group. The result has been disarticulation and disconnection within the CIS, also contrary to Russian intentions of having a unifying catalyst element in the former Soviet space. The former Soviet area, to a large extent due to its energy resources, has become an area of intersection of different interests, giving it complex contours. By assuring a margin of maneuver in political-diplomatic and economic terms, Moscow pursues simultaneously the goal of keeping this area as a special area of influence, and of counterbalancing and having a say regarding particularly the US presence in the region. This balancing has encompassed, therefore, contradictory tendencies of favoring the US, with regard, for example, to the stationing of troops in Central Asia, but also of restraint as to the extent and quality of this presence. In addition, the EU has been gaining added presence in the area, suggesting also a reactive attitude from Moscow, critical of the Union’s involvement, while attempting to establish preferential bilateral deals with EU members, such as Germany and even Hungary. As for the Asian dimension, concentrating attention on Central Asia, Moscow seeks both to assure energy resources and restrain the western and Asian (particularly Chinese) influence. This raises the question: how to deal with the western and eastern dimensions in Russian foreign policy dealings? Russia between west and east: The western and Asian dimensions in foreign policy In its affirmative course, Russia has to deal with and balance the western and eastern dimensions in its foreign policy, making the most of it. In its multivectorial foreign policy Moscow acknowledges the benefits arising from cooperation, though dissension over a number of issues remains, both to the west and east. The sharpening of differences evinced in early 2007 with Putin’s discourse loudly criticizing Washington’s assertive policies and 2 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation actions, and difficulties in the negotiation of a new model of cooperation with the EU, have to some extent promoted rapprochement between Russia and China, as well as India, though the latter to a less extent. How cooperative frameworks will be empowered remains open due to the bargaining and complex geostrategic game, particularly with regard to energy resou rces. Security issues, political sidings and economic matters are part of this game, either constraining options or opening new avenues for cooperation. The patterns change, mainly due to competing approaches, but it seems to be an underlying trend to see further collaboration in the east whenever relations with its western counterparts sour. A form of enhanced leverage, which has, however, limits due to the political confrontation between two giants, with both Russia and China’s desire for affirmation and primacy in the region. Thus, cooperation when possible, both to the east and west, while rivalry and competition are always present ingredients. The EU’s giant neighbor, the Russian Federation, is a relevant and strategic actor. Its non-inclusion in the European Neighborhood Policy package, despite the application of the same financial instruments, is an example of positive differentiation. Both the EU and Russia recognize the relevance of this bilateral relationship, underlined by substantial economic and commercial interdependence, along with common historical and political values. However, and despite the identification of these elements, many problems persist, which in the first months of 2007, seem to have further complicated dialogue. Difficulties regarding the negotiation of a new agreement to replace the PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement), which expired on 1 December 2007, are a clear demonstration of differences. The automatic renovation of the existing agreement was interpreted as a sign of a lack of political will to reformulate the terms of the relationship. A negative signal, translated on the one hand in the fact that Russia did not see a new agreement favoring its own interests, particularly regarding energy issues, with Russia accusing the EU of only opening its market to Russian energy resources and closing it to other economic assets; and, on the other hand, in the reticent posture of the EU in drawing a new model for relations with Moscow, as a result of the lack of a coherent strategy to deal with its giant neighbor. The lack of unity and cohesion in the EU has been exploited by Russia in a logic of power and division. Intransigence by Poland due to a Russian meat embargo, the demands from Lithuania regarding the reopening of the Druzhba pipeline, and the controversy in 13 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation Estonia due to the relocation of a Soviet war memorial in Tallinn, contrast with the agreement between Germany and Russia for the construction of the Nord stream gas pipeline through the Baltic or the abandoning by Hungary of the Nabucco project, which would bring natural gas to Europe from the Caspian, in favor of Gazprom Blue stream (Schopplin, 2007). But, in the face of dissension, the EU should keep tight to the principle of solidarity, called upon by Angela Merkel at the time of the Samara Summit in the first half of 2007, and work on the definition of a common strategy towards neighboring Russia. Despite its labeling as a â€Å"strategic partnership†, the EU-Russia relationship is, in fact, a strategic relation, but far from a partnership. Distrust, misunderstanding and mutual criticism have underlined differences, marking a negative stance. In a more optimistic tone, the development of the Four Common Spaces as agreed at in St. Petersburg in 2003 might constitute a good platform for dialogue. The cooling down of the more critical voices together with positive signs of a political will to consolidate this neighborly relation are fundamental. It is a strategic bilateral relationship that even not following a cohesive model, should be underlined by political will and joint ownership of responsibilities. Clear signs of the building of confidence together with dialogue and its translation in concrete projects are fundamental. Dialogue on energy, transfrontier cooperation, and the reinforcement of communication infrastructures are some of the areas where these developments might and should produce results. However, even in areas where effective collaboration is recognized as mutually beneficial, trade-offs are kept as an expression of the need from both sides to keep their bargaining power – an implicit demonstration of the underlying difficulties of this relationship. Despite official declarations trying to minimize the limited results of the last bilateral summits (Samara in May 2007 and Mafra in October of the same year), these have made the growing differences clear, with even official discourse not escaping a climate of growing hostility. This adds to President Putin’s harsh words in Munich in February 2007, and to the state of the nation discourse (26 April 2007), the last of his mandate, where the Russian president announced a moratorium on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, not ratified by some NATO members, together with the announced Russian withdrawal from the INF Treaty. In a context of high international tension, with delicate issues on the agenda, including the US anti-missile defense shield, the eternal question of 14 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation NATO enlargement, and the more enduring issues about (dis)respect of human rights and democratic principles, along with an inconsistent and non-cohesive posture from the EU and the souring of relations with the US, this attitude is not surprising. In fact, the Russia-US relationship seems to take on a more assertive tone. According to Mikhail Margelov, Russian Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, the â€Å"American propaganda machine fits any new problems related to the conflict of interests into the context of the US concern with the future of democracy in Russia and associates it with the current issues such as strengthening the ‘vertical of power’ in Russia. This makes it harder to continue bilateral cooperation and develops into another type of the fluctuating system of relationship priorities† (Margelov, 2006: 25). Cooperation with Washington does not prevent Moscow from criticizing the unilateral stance of Washington’s policy as countervailing international interests, and Russian interests in particular. Russia is very critical about NATO’s enlargement policies and the deployment of military forces close to its borders, showing a persistent fear over western institutions. Agreement on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in its new format as â€Å"NATO at 20† (now at 27), meaning an equal status to Russia in decision-making regarding European security, diminished the voices of discontent, though it did not silence them. Moscow and Washington collaborate in the fight against terror and organized crime, the proliferation of WMD, the fostering of democratic political systems, the protection of individual rights, and the consolidation of economic benefits. These goals have been stated in the Moscow Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship signed in May 2002, and reaffirmed in meetings and statements in both capitals. Moscow shut down some cold war military facilities, amply supported the US campaign in Afghanistan, and gave its consent to the stationing of American military forces in Central Asia, showing a cooperative stance (Blagov, 2004). In response, it received recognition as a market economy, full membership in the G8 group, and support for its accession to the World Trade Organization. These areas of cooperation have found resistance in topics over which disagreement prevails. Certain American actions reinforced the suspicions of some Russians that the US is seeking to parlay the war against terror into a war for control of oil, gas, and pipeline routes (Foglesong and Hahn, 2002: 11), linking directly political and economic issues. Moreover, the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001, 15 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation despite the signature of a new treaty in May 2002 concerning the reduction of long-range nuclear weapons – the Strategic Offensive [Arms] Reduction Treaty (known as SORT) –, and the development of the national missile defense shield, with concrete expression in the deployment of sophisticated military equipment in Poland and the Czech Republic, raised suspicion in Russia. In reaction, Moscow announced the adoption of a preemptive military doctrine following the footsteps of Washington, as well as the development of a new nuclear missile system as an assurance of Russia’s security. The post-September 11 primacy discourse of the US has, thus, been eliciting a tougher position from Russia. Simultaneously it has been promoting rapprochement to the east, with the triangle formed by Russia, China and India gaining consistency. In fact, â€Å"India, China and Russia account for 40 per cent of the world’s population, a fifth of its economy and more than half of its nuclear warheads† (Page, 2007), conferring on this triangulation of power interesting contours. However, this rapprochement seems more the result of a negative dynamic of countering US primacy, than being genuinely built over shared principles and common endeavors. Although the potential for cooperation in economic and military terms is substantial, social and political factors hamper a relationship free of geopolitical constraints. Issues related to minorities and competition between giants for regional affirmation are examples. Nevertheless, the agendas have been dominated by the powerful drive to balance US weight, based on the assumption that â€Å"the more that Russia and other Asian nations can cooperate with each other in creating a multipolar system in this region, the more Russia and others hope they can limit the United States to pursuing goals they all (especially Russia) approve† (Katz, 2006: 147). In addition, they share the multipolar and terrorism-fighting discourse, have taken the same path regarding Iraq in 2003, and share a common approach towards Iran, hold important commercial ties, particularly in military and energy terms, and avoid interference in internal affairs, such as in Chechnya, Xinjiang or regarding instability in northeast India. In this context, Russians state that â€Å"[m]ultidimensional, mutually beneficial cooperation has become a distinguishing feature of relations with our greatest Asian friends – China and India† (Ivanov, 2003: 37). The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001, and its empowerment in order to render it a significant regional military bloc (Kapila, 16 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation 2006); the Joint Declaration on the International Order in the 21st Century, of July 2005; and the first Russian-ASEAN summit, in December 2005, described as â€Å"Russia’s ‘peaceful offensive’ at Asia† (Ivanov, 2006: 54), are xpressive of the moves to foster regional interlinkages, described officially as a result of the regional effort at further integration and not directed at countervailing US primacy. The closer Sino-Russian relationship is, therefore, under close scrutiny in Washington. While the US understands the difficulties in empowering a strategic partnership between Russia and China (two competing powers in the region), it sees with caution rapprochement between the two giants. Russia and China have been successful in using the USA’s strong aversion to terrorism since 9/11 for their own ends – to tackle Islamic insurgency within their territories† (Pant, 2004: 315). However, â€Å"[n]ot only are Russia, China, and India too weak to balance US power in any significant measure, the allure of US power remains too strong for them to resist† (Pant, 2004: 313). Thus, the idea of a â€Å"strategic triangle† seems still far. US policies have driven Russia and China closer, and India has joined due to its long term and long stated concern regarding the need for a multipolar world order. However, it seems clear that â€Å"Russian policy towards Asia is not the result of doctrine, but is based on pragmatism, and dynamic policies in this area are balanced by the obvious domination of its European policy† (Slezneva, 2003: 19). Thus, this regional engagement seems to reflect a feeling of western challenge to natural areas of influence, of a particular relevant strategic nature, such as Central Asia and the Caucasus. But we cannot discard the fact that these same areas are subject of regional competition, and of a weight-measuring game between Russia and China, where power politics play a fundamental role. But as Russia bandwagons towards the US, China does the same, avoiding to be marginalized from the international security dealings, playing for example an active role in negotiations with North Korea, a role very much appreciated in Washington (Pant, 2004: 324). This same reasoning applies to the possibilities and limits of the SCO, since â€Å"[t]o a large extent, common, positive targets are absent. For example, China is seeking markets and energy resources; Russia is eager to regain its leadership status within the CIS as well as that of a superpower in the international arena; and the Central Asian regimes consider the SCO as their guarantee for political survival† (Haas, 2006). This means various possibilities remain open while the geostrategic game is played, with policies of 17 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation approchement, collaboration, bandwagon, competition, and confrontation being weighed in a constant cost-benefit equation. Conclusion Russian foreign policy has been revealing elements of continuity, with an affirmative course underlying its policy making, bargaining and implementation. It translates the Russian desire for recognition as a key player in the international system, complaining against what it understands as double-standards, demanding what it sees as of its own right, cooperating whenever adv antageous. It seems that the Russian affirmative course has been the result of its domestic political options, resulting from a strong construction of perceptions and confidence in ruling, built upon the stability discourse, and rendered operational in domestic stabilization and economic growth. This enhanced internal context allows for outside power projection, built on popular consent regarding Russian affirmation as a great power, in line with its historical past, and searching for accommodation with a changing present. But as much as this search for affirmation needs internal grounding, it is also based on Russian traditional power politics and assertive dealings when applied to external policy. This demonstrates the close inter-linkage between the internal and external dimensions of policy-making, and the relevance of strong domestic support for outside affirmative expression. And this course has been pursued essentially in a proactive manner, particularly under Putin’s presidency, as a foreign policy goal of regaining international recognition. In this game of engagement and disengagement, Russia has been following both a collaborative and a competitive course, which instills a sense of ambiguity to foreign policy: collaboration as a way of preserving international security, according to the Russian model, signing accords and defining the level of western engagement in the former Soviet space, which Russia only acquiesces to when convenient; competition whenever Moscow feels its interests are under threat, using political and economic leverage and resorting to concrete pressure as a way to invert unfavorable tendencies. The underlying discourse of promoting a multipolar international system, subscribed by partners to the east and west against US primacy, in a more explicit or implicit manner, is a reflex of the continuous 18 The Making of Russian Foreign Policy: Lines of (Dis)continuity in a Process of Affirmation bargaining between extending cooperative approaches and avoiding competitive losses that might put in jeopardy Moscow’s search for primacy. In addition, Russia has been fighting internally with ambiguity, trying to deal with both an evolution in attitudes and a changed domestic and international context, while seeking to cope with its historical past and the legacies inherited from centuries of autocratic ruling and imperial status. A mixture of different tendencies that reveals itself in Russian current dealings, demonstrating the difficulties the state has been facing in the definition of its own identity, fundamental for justifying trends, options, attitudes. 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